In this WG final-call updated version, we added descriptions for possible future applications provided by LDACS, updated the security descriptions, corrected minor typos and updated abbreviations.
The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is the cornerstone for enabling automated landings without the Instrument Landing System (ILS). Currently GBAS is evolving to GBAS Approach Service Type-D (GAST-D) for Category (CAT) III landings. This development towards GBAS GAST-D extends GBAS via the use of multiple frequencies (L1/L2 and L5) and the use of multiple global navigation satellite system constellations. GBAS requires correction data to be broadcast to aircraft, which is currently handled via the VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) datalink. However, VDB has several known shortcomings: (1) low throughput, (2) small area of operation and (3) no cyber-security measures. In this paper we propose the use of the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) for broadcasting GBAS correction data to address these shortcomings. In flight experiments conducted in 2019, we set up an experimental GBAS installation using LDACS. Broadcast data was secured using the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) broadcast authentication protocol. Our results indicate that cryptographically secured GBAS data via LDACS can provide GAST-C and GAST-D services with high availability if cryptographic parameters are chosen appropriately.
Growth of civil air traffic and new entrants into the air transportation sector such as Unmanned AeronauticalVehicles (UAV) pose a great challenge for air traffic management and its supporting Communication, Navigation and …
VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) currently used by GBAS has been identified as a potential source of cyber-security concerns. The use of an alternative datalink providing the bandwidth for more capable security protocols has therefore been proposed and …
In IETF 110 we mainly talk about security aspects of LDACS. We introduce the LDACS PKI, certificates, mutual authentication and key establishment schemes for LDACS, user-data protection and control-data protection concepts and close with a draft final call to the WG.
This was a major update for us since we added several pages about the foreseen security features in LDACS. With the definition of ICAO Doc. 9896 of LDACS as a Link Layer technology, providing access to the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) within the Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) plans of ICAO, strong access controls and user- and control plane security, are a MUST for LDACS.
Today's analog voice-based air–ground communication system for tactical aircraft guidance is suffering from the VHF band's increasing saturation in high-density areas. The air–ground communication infrastructure is therefore undergoing digitisation …
In IETF 109, after having passed adoption by the working group, we incorporated all the feedback we received from the group and mostly worked on clarifying the objectives for LDACS.