Publications

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-14

This version of our IETF draft has been adopted by the IESG.

A Secure Ground Handover Protocol for LDACS

The L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), the worldwide first true integrated Communication, Navigation and …

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-13

We made this update to incorporate all comments from the IESG.

Secure Point-to-Point Long-Distance Multi-Hop Connections in a Dense Airplane Mesh-Network using LDACS

The capacity of current aeronautical datalinks is reaching its limits and becomes a hindrance to the growth of worldwide civil …

Security in Digital Aeronautical Communications - A Comprehensive Gap Analysis

Aeronautical communications still heavily depend on analog radio systems, despite the fact that digital communication has been introduced to aviation in the 1990’s. Since then, the digitization of civil aviation has been continued, as considerable pressure to rationalize the aeronautical spectrum has built up. In any modern digital communications system, the threat of digital attacks needs to be considered carefully. This is especially true for safety-critical infrastructure, which aviation’s operational communication services clearly are. In this article, we reverse the traditional approach in the aeronautical industry of looking at a system from the safety perspective and assume a security-oriented point of view. We use the lens of security properties to review the requirements and specifications of aeronautical communications infrastructure as of 2021 and observe that most standards lack cybersecurity as a key requirement. Furthermore, we review the academic literature to identify possible solutions for the lack of cybersecurity measures in aeronautical communications system. We observe that most systems have been thoroughly analyzed within the academic security community, some for decades even, with many papers proposing concrete solutions to missing cybersecurity features. We conclude that there is a systematic problem in the design process of aeronautical communication systems. We provide a list of eight key findings and recommendations to improve the process of specifying such systems in a secure manner.

Advancing the Security of LDACS

The “Single European Sky” air traffic management master plan foresees the introduction of several modern digital data links for aeronautical communications. The candidate for long-range continental communications is the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS). LDACS is a cellular, ground-based digital communications system for flight guidance and communications related to safety and regularity of flight. Hence, the aeronautical standards, imposed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), for cybersecurity of the link and network layer, apply. In previous works, threat-and risk analyses of LDACS were conducted, a draft for an LDACS cybersecurity architecture introduced, algorithms proposed, and the security of a Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment (MAKE) procedure of LDACS formally verified. However, options for cipher-suites and certificate management for LDACS were missing. Also, previous works hardly discussed the topic of post-quantum security for LDACS. This paper proposes a cell-attachment procedure, which establishes a secure LDACS communication channel between an aircraft and corresponding ground-station upon cell-entry of the aircraft. Via the design of a hybrid LDACS Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the choice of a pre-or post-quantum Security Level (SL) is up to the communications participants. With that, this work introduces a full LDACS cell-attachment protocol based on a PKI, certificates, certificate revocation and cipher-suites including pre-and post-quantum options. Evaluations in the symbolic model show the procedure to fulfill LDACS security requirements and a communications performance evaluation demonstrates feasibility, matching requirements imposed by regulatory documents.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-12

This document gives an overview of the architecture of the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides a …

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-11

In this version, we made an update to clarify teh scope an intent of the standardization effort of LDACS at the IETF.

Formal Verification of the LDACS MAKE Protocol

In our talk, we therefore present the first formal verification of the security properties of the updated LDACS 3-pass Mutual …

LDACS Broadcast Digital Voice Concept and Expected Performance

The amount of air traffic is rapidly recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic and beginning to rise above previous levels. As a result, …

Improving Usable LDACS Data Rate via Certificate Validity Optimization

Since the beginning of the century, an increasing amount of air traffic has pushed current aeronautical communication systems to their …

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-10

This document provides an overview of the architecture of the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides …

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-09

Here, we restructured chapter 9 and 10 and incorporated parts of these chapter to chapter 7.

Group Key Distribution Procedures for the L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)

Since the beginning of the century, an increasing amount of air traffic has pushed current aeronautical communication systems to their …

A Secure Broadcast Service for LDACS with an Application to Secure GBAS

GBAS, LDACS, TESLA, Performance Optimization, Cybersecurity

Formal Security Verification of the Station-to-Station based Cell-attachment Procedure of LDACS

Aeronautical communications systems are currently undergoing a modernization process. Analogue legacy systems shall be replaced with …

A Secure Cell-Attachment Procedure of LDACS

In Europe the Single European Sky air traffic management master plan foresees the introduction of several modern digital data links for …

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-08

In this WG final-call updated version, we added descriptions for possible future applications provided by LDACS, updated the security descriptions, corrected minor typos and updated abbreviations.

Flight Trial Demonstration of Secure GBAS via the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)

The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is the cornerstone for enabling automated landings without the Instrument Landing System (ILS). Currently GBAS is evolving to GBAS Approach Service Type-D (GAST-D) for Category (CAT) III landings. This development towards GBAS GAST-D extends GBAS via the use of multiple frequencies (L1/L2 and L5) and the use of multiple global navigation satellite system constellations. GBAS requires correction data to be broadcast to aircraft, which is currently handled via the VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) datalink. However, VDB has several known shortcomings: (1) low throughput, (2) small area of operation and (3) no cyber-security measures. In this paper we propose the use of the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) for broadcasting GBAS correction data to address these shortcomings. In flight experiments conducted in 2019, we set up an experimental GBAS installation using LDACS. Broadcast data was secured using the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) broadcast authentication protocol. Our results indicate that cryptographically secured GBAS data via LDACS can provide GAST-C and GAST-D services with high availability if cryptographic parameters are chosen appropriately.

PMAKE: Physical Unclonable Function-based Mutual Authentication Key Exchange Scheme for Digital Aeronautical Communications

Growth of civil air traffic and new entrants into the air transportation sector such as Unmanned AeronauticalVehicles …

Performance-Optimizing Secure GBAS over LDACS

VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) currently used by GBAS has been identified as a potential source of cyber-security concerns. The use of an …

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-07

This was a major update for us since we added several pages about the foreseen security features in LDACS. With the definition of ICAO Doc. 9896 of LDACS as a Link Layer technology, providing access to the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) within the Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) plans of ICAO, strong access controls and user- and control plane security, are a MUST for LDACS.

Cybersecurity for the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)

Today’s analog voice-based air–ground communication system for tactical aircraft guidance is suffering from the VHF band’s …

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-06

In this update we fixed some formulation issues in the security section on LDACS.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-05

In this update we officially and fully introduced the requirements language by IETF. Also, we added some new, important references.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-04

In this update we fixed some imprecise wording, especially in the security section. Furthermore work on restructuring paragraphs with the important IETF words defined in RFC 2119 MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, MAY was started.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-03

In this update, we formatted the DO-350A requirements to IETF conform draft standard and we fixed the position of th terminology chapter.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-02

In this update, we fixed all missing abbreviations and incorporated further feedback on LDACS communication and security requirements.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-01

We clearly list communication and surveillance requirements for LDACS from the RTCA DO-350A standard.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-ietf-raw-ldacs-00

With this update and renaming of the draft, the WG RAW has officially adopted the working document for LDACS. Thus we have incorporated all the feedback from the WG RAW we received after the version draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-06.

Comparing Different Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Flavors for LDACS

Growth of civil air traffic worldwide poses a great challenge for the supporting Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) …

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-06

In this update we go deeper about the requirements for digital datalinks in aeronautics. We have updated chapter 6 for that purpose and explained requirements in depth coming from RTCA DO-350A.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-05

We have received feedback on ground infrastructure, security, requirement analysis and more. Thus we created chapter 6 - Requirements to LDACS - and extended the chapter 8 on reliability and chapter 10 on security extensively.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-04

In version 04, we added section “7. Reliability and Availability”, where we list LDACS reliability measures for reliable and robust transmission of wireless data. These include PHY layer robustness due to robust modulation and coding, a fixed frame structure, robust resource scheduling, efficient load balancing, ARQ protocols and priority mechanisms for data prioritization, just to name a few.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-03

We added section “5. Applicability” were we explain the difference between LDACS and legacy data links for digital aeronautical data links for civil aviation data traffic. These include message priorities, security features, high data-rates, multi-link environment, air-to-air extension and full CNS capability.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-02

This document provides an overview of the architecture of the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), which provides a secure, scalable and spectrum efficient terrestrial data link for civil aviation. LDACS is a scheduled, reliable multi-application cellular broadband system with support for IPv6.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-01

In the second version of our LDACS IETF document, we explain characteristics of LDACS in even greater detail, explain the LDACS Sub-Network concept, give details on the Medium Access (MAC), mobility and LDACS incremental deployment concept (chapter 5). Protocol stack and services of each protocol layer are presented in a more precise way (chapter 6) than in the previous version.

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-00

This is the first draft for the LDACS IETF project. Here we reduce the official LDACS specification to the important details for the IETF and its relevance for RAW. We explain the motivation of digital aeronautical datalinks (chapter 3), present the characteristics of LDACS (chapter 5), the architecture of the LDACS protocol stack (chapter 6) and gibe an overview of foreseen security features of LDACS (chapter 7).

FACTS2: Framework for Aeronautical Communications and Traffic Simulations 2

Civil air traffic is currently growing by about 2.7% per year and, thus, is expected to double in the next 26 years. To cope with this …

An Air Traffic Management Data Traffic Pattern for Aeronautical Communication System Evaluations

Modern air traffic management relies on a communication infrastructure increasingly suffering from the VHF band’s growing …

Evaluation of the LDACS Cybersecurity Implementation

Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) infrastructure in civil aviation must evolve as fast as possible to cope with all …

Application of AI in the NAS-the Rationale for AI-Enhanced Airspace Management

This paper extends on the initial findings of “Application of Artificial Intelligence in the National Airspace System: A …

Towards Successful Realization of the LDACS Cybersecurity Architecture: An Updated Datalink Security Threat- And Risk Analysis

Currently Communication Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) in civil aviation are undergoing huge changes in the framework of the …

A Cybersecurity Architecture for the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)

With air transportation growing and current civil aeronautical communication systems reaching their capacity limit in high density …

Transmitting GBAS messages via LDACS

The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is a landing system for aircraft based on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). It …

Paving the way for an it security architecture for LDACS: A datalink security threat and risk analysis

With air transportation growing and current civil aeronautical communication systems reaching their capacity limit in high density …

L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) flight trials in the national German project MICONAV

Today’s voice-based air-ground communication system for aircraft guidance is suffering from increasing saturation of the VHF band …